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-IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 
CUYAHOGA COUNTY, OHIO 
CHARLES MURRAY, EXECUTOR, 
Plaintiff 
v 
STATE OF OHIO 
Defendant 
CASE NO. 312322 
JUDGE: SUSTER 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
EXCLUDE PORTIONS OF 
TESTIMONY OF DR. MOHAMMED 
TAHIR PURSUANT TO EVID. R. 
901 (A) AND 702 
Defendant, by and through counsel, William D. Mason, Prosecuting Attorney for Cuyahoga 
County and Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Marilyn B. Cassidy, move this honorable court to 
exclude testimony that the state expects from Plaintiffs expert, Dr. Mohammed Tahir. There are 
two principle grounds for this motion. First, plaintiff can authenticate neither the exhibit 
purporting to be a" wood chip from the basement riser", nor the exhibit claimed to be the stain 
from the wardrobe door, as required by Evid. R. 901. Hence, the proposed exhibits are 
inadmissible evidence. Second, Dr. Tahir's opinions as to exhibits including the trousers, door 
stain, wood chip, A59-1 and A59-2, and B-4-A (porch stain) do not meet a standard of reasonable 
scientific certainty and are thus, not competent expert opinions under Ohio law. With specific 
regard to the porch stain, no opinion is presented based on the witness' expertise. Hence, no 
,_ 
-
testimony is permissible. The unauthenticated exhibits and any incompetent expert testimony 
should be excluded, all as is set forth in the memorandum attached hereto and incorporated herein 
by reference. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WILLIAM D. MASON, PROSECUTING 
ATTORNEY, CUYAHOGA COUNTY 
Ma ·1yn . 
Assistant osecutor 
1200 Ontario Street 
Cleveland, Ohio 44113 
(216) 443-7785 
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MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 
I. PLAINTIFF CANNOT AUTHENTICATE THE PURPORTED WOODCHIP AND 
WARDROBE DOOR STAIN AS REQUIRED BY EVID. R. 901 AND THEY 
SHOULD BE EXLUDED. 
Defendant anticipates that Dr. Mohammad Tahir will attempt to testify as an expert as to 
the origin of DNA evidence, specifically the blood- stain on a wood chip and the bloodstain on 
the wardrobe door. Tahir is also expected testify relative to a stain from the porch (Exhibit B-4-
1) Defendant submits that such testimony is impermissible under Ohio Evid. R. 901. Dr. Tahir's 
testimony relates to items that cannot be accounted for during the last forty-five and one-half 
years. Furthermore, the unknown whereabouts of this evidence indicate the possibility of 
tampering or confusion as to the identity of the evidence. Absent sufficient evidence as to the 
identity and authenticity of the exhibit, these items must be excluded. 
Evid. R. 901 provides, in pertinent part: 
Requirement of Authentication or Identification 
(A) General Provision. The requirement of authentication or identification as a 
condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to 
support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims. 
In authenticating any evidence,[ the proponent] must be able to "sufficiently identify" the 
evidence in order for the testimony of the expert to be admitted. See, State v. Brown (1995), 107 
Ohio App.3d 194; State v. Frye (1992), unreported, 1992 WL 303120. Furthermore, chain of 
custody is part of the mandate set forth by Evid. R. 901, and [the proponent] has the burden of 
establishing the chain of custody of a specific piece of evidence. Brown, 107 at 200. (citing State 
v. Barzacchini (1994), 96 Ohio App.3d 440, 457-8). In interpreting Rule 901, Ohio courts have 
consistently held that the burden of establishing a chain of evidence to identify the specimens or 
3 
_ exhibits is upon [the proponent of the evidence}. State v. Moore (1973), 47 Ohio App. 2d 181, 
183. (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Although the burden is not absolute, the proponent 
must satisfy the court, with reasonable certainty, that confusion with the identity of the specimen 
or the possibility of tampering did not occur. State v. Moore, supra. 
Applying the law to the case at hand, it becomes clear that the Plaintiff fails to meet such 
requirements. The evidence in question, the blood- stain on the wood chip and the bloodstain 
from the wardrobe door, were both exhibits in the 1966 trial. From that point, until now, the 
Plaintiff is unable to account for their whereabouts. Rather, thirty four and one-half years later 
they are offered as evidence without any authentication or identification. Evidence to date 
reveals gaps spanning years in a so-called chain of custody. 
Plaintiff's failure to demonstrate a chain of custody, failure to sufficiently identify the 
- evidence, and failure to establish with reasonable certainty that substitution, alteration and 
tampering did not occur, render absent the requirements for admissibility under Ohio Avid. R. 
901. Hence, the exhibits purporting to be the stain on the wardrobe door, and the woodchip from 
the basement riser cannot be admitted into evidence. See, Brown; Moore; Barzacchini. 
-
The purpose of the Ohio Rules of Evidence requiring authentication and identification is 
to ensure the credibility of evidence. Without evidence as to the whereabouts and conditions 
related to these exhibits, indicia of authenticity are absent. As a result, the condition precedent to 
admissibility established by Evid. R. 90l(A) is not satisfied and the evidence must be excluded. 
4 
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II. OPINIONS OF TAHIR, IF ANY, ARE MADE WITHOUT THE REQUISITE LEVEL 
OF SCIENTIFC CERTAINTY AND SHOULD BE EXCLUDED 
Dr. Tahir will attempt to testify about DNA analyses conducted upon exhibits A59-l, A59-2, 
woodchip from the basement riser, stain from the wardrobe door, and trousers of Samuel H. 
Sheppard. Dr. Tahir's conclusions are not made to a reasonable scientific certainty and 
accordingly, are not permissible evidence. 
In this jurisdiction, an expert opinion is competent only if it is held to a reasonable degree of 
scientific certainty. In this context, " reasonable certainty" means "probability, " State v. Benner, 
(1988) 40 Ohio St. 3d 301. In a recent case, this court equated "extremely likely" to the word 
"probable." Benner, supra citing State v. Buell (1986) 22 Ohio St. 3d 124. The Benner Court 
reviewed definitions of the words" likely" and "probably" in the context of such opinions and 
concluded that the term, "more than likely", a phrase that falls somewhere between "likely and 
extremely likely", is an appropriate standard. 
Below are excerpts of Dr. Tahir's deposition testimony which illustrate that any opinion he 
has fails to meet the requisite standard: 
• WOODCHIP Q. Can you say that this is Richard Eberling's blood on this object? 
Page 44 A. No ... 
Q. Is it scientifically accurate to say this is Richard Eberling's blood? 
A. No. 
Q. Is it scientifically accurate to say that this test result somehow puts 
Richard Eberling at the location where this blood was recovered? 
5 
--
• DOORSTAIN 
Page 56 
•TROUSERS 
Page 64 
A. My answer is the same thing. I cannot say it's his blood or his 
DNA. No matter how many questions you ask on the same line, 
bottom line is I cannot say that's his blood. 
Q. Can you say Richard Eberling's blood is in 1-C? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you ever tell anyone that Richard Eberling's specific blood 
was in this? 
A. No. All I can see is he cant be excluded. 
Q. Did you ever tell anyone that his blood was in the tube? 
A. No sir. 
Q. Did you ever tell anybody this is Richard Eberling's blood? 
A. No. 
Q. Would it be scientifically accurate to say this is Richard 
Eberling's blood? 
A. No. 
Q. Is it scientifically accurate to say that's Richard Eberling's blood 
on that swatch of clothing? 
A. I didn't say that. 
Q. I'm saying if someone made that statement is that scientifically 
accurate? 
A. No. 
6 
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• A-59-1 
VAGINAL SMEAR 
Page 78 
• A-59-2 
Q. Did you ever tell anyone that Richard Eberling's DNA was in the 
sperm fraction on this slide A-59-1? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you ever tell anyone that this was Richard Eberling's sperm? 
A. No sir. 
Q. Is it scientifically accurate to say that this is Richard eberling's 
sperm based on this result? 
A. No. 
Q. Can you say that the 4.1 in A-59-2 came from a particular person? 
VAGINAL SMEAR A. No. 
Page 88 Q. Can you say it came from Richard Eberling? 
A. No. 
Q. Can you say his DNA was on that slide? 
A. No. 
Q. Is there Richard Eberling's sperm in this sperm fraction result 
that you have? 
A. No. That's multiple profile. 
Q. Is Richard Eberling's sperm in there? 
A. No. 
III. PORCH STAIN (EX B-4-A) 
Plaintiff seeks to introduce expert testimony by a DNA expert, Mohammed Tahir. In 
.- addition to the argument set forth above, which Defendant submits applies to this exhibit as 
7 
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well, Defendant asserts that the inconclusive result reached by Dr.Tahir in typing Exhibit B-4-
A (porch stain) is not admissible evidence for the reason that it fails to constitute opinion. 
Moreover, any comment upon that inconclusive result will not assist the jury, and will likely 
confuse and/or mislead the jury. Accordingly it should be excluded under both Evid. R. 702 
and 403(A). 
Evid. R. 702 sets the parameters under which an expert may testify. The state does not 
dispute Tahir's credentials or qualification of an expert. However, an expert must demonstrate 
some knowledge on the particular subject superior to that possessed by an ordinary juror. Scott 
v. Yates (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 219, citing State Auto Mutual Ins. Co. v. Chrysler Corp, (1973), 
36 Ohio St. 2d 151, 160. The test was set forth in State Auto Mutual Ins. Co. v. Chrysler Corp, 
supra: 
"His qualification depends upon his possession of special knowledge which he can impart 
to the jury, and which will assist them in regard to a pertinent matter, ... and it must appear 
he has an opinion of his own, or is able to form one, on the particular question. " 
Emphasis Added. 
In the instant case, Dr. Tahir, on page two of his report dated February 3, 1997 states, 
"DNA results for item #B-4-A (stain from porch) was typed with inconclusive results". 
Thus, Dr. Tahir has no opinion, to a reasonable scientific certainty, as to what donors of the 
stain may be included or excluded. For that reason, he has no information about that stain that 
will assist the jury in evaluating it. Moreover, any comment by Dr. Tahir would amount to 
sheer speculation and is likely to confuse or mislead the jury. The very mention of an 
inconclusive result by an expert such as Tahir is misleading because, although he is stating that 
he can draw no scientifically accurate conclusion, a juror can surmise that the evidence is 
somehow scientifically significant by virtue of the fact that he examined it. In view of the lack 
8 
-of probative value coupled with the risk of misleading the jury, the State respectfully requests 
that this evidence be excluded. 
N. CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff cannot authenticate the exhibits purporting to be a bloodstain from the basement 
riser, stain from the wardrobe door as required by Evid. R. 901. These exhibits were in the 
possession of the State of Ohio as of 1966. During the intervening thirty- four years, the 
whereabouts of these exhibits are unknown for periods of years. Plaintiff cannot satisfy the 
court with reasonable certainty that confusion in identification or tampering has not occurred. 
In addition, Dr. Tahir has rendered no conclusions pursuant to his expert analysis which 
meet a reasonable scientific certainty linking Richard Eberling to the stained trousers, the door 
stain, the stain on wood chip from the basement riser, and the two vaginal smear slides. He 
has no opinion derived from his expertise about the exhibit #B-4-A (porch stain). Under Evid. 
R. 702, 403 (A) and Ohio case law, no testimony about the exhibit should be permitted. 
Defendant respectfully requests that the court so direct. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WILLIAM D. MASON, PROSECUTING 
ATTORNEY, CUYAHOGA COUNTY 
9 
-CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
A copy of the foregoing Memorandum in Support Excluding Portions of 
Testimony by Dr. Mohammed Tahir was hand delivered to Terry Gilbert, attorney for 
Plaintiff, at Court Room 20 (B) on the_}__ day of March 2000. 
Respectfully, 
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1 Q. 
2 A. 
3 Q. 
4 
5 
6' 
7 Q. 
8 
9 A. 
10 
11 
12 
13 Q. 
14 
15 
16 A. 
17 Q. 
18 
19 A. 
20 Q. 
21 
,. .. ~ 22 
23 A. 
24 Q. 
25 
re 'fl Z' 
Yes. 
No. 
44 
Okay. Can you tell us who deposited the 4.1 in the 
DQ Alpha? 
MR. GILBERT: You mean who -- The name 
of the person? 
(BY MR. BOLAND) Can you identify the person who 
deposited the 4.1? 
In this report I have given the blood of Eberling, 
and in this case that was the only one. The second 
report I have two other people. But in this 
comparing with this, Eberling cannot be excluded. 
Let me rephrase my question. I understand what you 
just said. Can you tell me that that 4.1 came from 
Richard Eberling? 
Just saying that's him? 
That's my question. Did the 4.1 come from Richard 
Eberling's DNA? 
No. He cannot be excluded. 
Can you say any of the other alleles in these 
polymarkers, if any of those alleles came from 
Richard Eberling? Can you conclude that definitely? 
No. He cannot be excluded. That's all I can say. 
I understand. His exclusion I'll get into. But m1 
question is can you say that came from him? 
MIZANIN REPORTING SERVICE, INC. 
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1 A. No. 
2 Q. Okay. We'll get into this exclusion issue. Is 
3 there a test available to answer that question I 
4 just asked you to determine if any of those alleles 
5 in the polymarkers of the DQ Alpha came from Richard 
6 Eberling? Is there a test that can be run to 
7 determine that? 
8 A. Sure. If there is enough evidence sample, sure, you 
9 can do it. 
10 Q. Given what we have now, the technology we have now 
11 and these samples? 
12 A. Not to my knowledge. 
..,,... ~ ,., .. 13 Q. Okay. Can you tell me the number, the exact number, 
14 of different people that contributed DNA to this 
Item No. 3? 
A. 4.1 there could be one person. 1.1 and 2 could be 
another person. 2 and 3 another. And 4.1 and 2. 
4.1 and 3. So you can make all these combinations. 
Q. So my question is therefore can you tell me an exact 
number of people that contributed all this DNA? Is 
it seven people that are here or is it four? Do you 
have an exact number? That's what I'm asking, not a 
range. Is there an exact number of people? 
A. I can calculate, but not right now. 
Q. so you can determine the exact number of people that 
MIZANIN REPORTING SERVICE, INC. 
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.... 1 stain on this object? 
2 A. No. 
3 Q. Okay. Can you say that this is Richard Eberling•-
4 blood on this object? 
5 A. No. 
6 Q. Okay. Did you ever tell anyone that Richard 
7 Eberling's DNA was on this object? 
8 A. No. 
9 Q. Did you ever tell anyone that Richard Eberling's DNA 
10 was in the blood on this object? 
11 A. No. 
12 Q. Okay. Did you ever tell anyone that this was 
13 Richard Eberling's blood? 
14 A. No. I said he cannot be excluded. My answer is 
15 cannot be excluded. 
16 Q. Is it scientifically accurate to say this is Richard 
17 Eberling's blood? 
18 A. No. 
19 Q. Is it scientifically accurate to say that this test 
20 result somehow puts Richard Eberling at the location 
~· 
b 
~ ~: 
t ~ 
21 where this blood was recovered? 
> ~ •• 
i~ 22 23 A. My answer is the same thing. I cannot say it's his blood or his DNA. No matter how many questions you 
24 ask on the same line, bottom line is I cannot say 
25 that's his blood. 
MIZANIN REPORTING SERVICE, INC. 
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1 the little dusting brown blood that you tested? Can 
21 
A. 
31 
41 
Q. 
A. 5 
you say that? 
When you say that you mean identify him, just him? 
Is Richard Eberling's DNA in that blood? 
Not. Like he can't be excluded? 
6 Q. That's what I'm saying. Is his DNA blood in that 
7 DNA? 
8 A. No. 
9 Q. 
101 A. 
Can you say this is Richard Eberling's blood in 1-C? 
No. 
11 Q. Did you ever tell anyone that Richard Eberling 1 s 
121 
A. 131 
specific blood was in this? 
No. All I can say is he can't be excluded. 
14 Q . Did you ever tell anyone that his blood was in the 
.' 
15. 
}~ .. 
16! A. 7t·;. 
I ·c-
·:··· 
ti-
1 7' Q. J ~:~ 
191 
~; 
··11 
2al 
A. 
' . ll'f - Q . 
. ~;;: 
~~:~. 
'~-\ 
. -- 't 21 ·~-l : '~ .. ,~f: 
tube? 
No, sir. 
Did you ever tell anybody this is Richard Eberling 1 s 
blood? 
No, sir. 
Would it be scientifically accurate to say this is 
Richard Eberling 1 s blood? 
.YJ~-
22 A. No. 
23 Q. Let's move on to Tahir Exhibit No. 1, your item 
24 number is b-3-b-1. You describe it as a blood stain 
25 from Sam Sheppard's trousers. Can you tell me who 
MIZANIN REPORTING SERVICE, INC. 
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1 Q. Is it scientifically accurate to say that's Richard 
2 Eberling's blood on that swatch of clothing? 
3 A. I didn't say that. 
4 Q. I'm saying if someone made that statement, is that 
5, scientifically accurate? 
6 A. No. 
7 Q. Let's move on to the next item, which is your item 
8 number on Tahir Exhibit No. 1, your first test 
9 results, Item A-59-1, which you describe as a vaginal 
10 smear from Marilyn Sheppard. 
11 A. That's right. 
' :;.. 12 Q. Who did you receive that sample from? 
..;~:. 
_,.,,,. /·: 13 A. ?:·. 
r,. 
Cuyahoga County Coroner's Office. 
~~,, 14 Q. 
•..J; 
When did you receive that? 
" \;:
1::,~,' 15 A. - }:, May 2, 1996. 
,"X; 
;!· f 16 Q. ~ 1: r 17 ·' ;o> 
And what were you told this was that you were 
receiving, this individual package? 
18 A. Vaginal smears. 
19 Q. Who told you that? 
20 A. It was written on the package. 
21 Q. Did you document the receipt of that object the same 
22, way you did others? 
23 A. The same way. They came in the one box. 
24 Q. How many people in your lab handled this object? 
25 A. I handled it. 
MIZANIN REPORTING SERVICE, INC. 
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1 somewhere on this mixed result? 
2' A. No. 
3 Q. Did you ever tell anyone that Richard Eberling's 
4 DNA was on the slide A-59-1? 
5 A. No. 
6 Q. Did you ever tell anyone that Richard Eberling's DNA 
7 was in the sperm fraction on this slide? 
81 A. No. 
9 Q. Did you ever tell anyone that this was Richard 
10 Eberling's sperm? 
11 A. No, sir. 
12 Q. Is it scientifically accurate to say that this is 
13 Richard Eberling's sperm based on this result? 
14 A. No. 
15 (Recess taken.) 
16 Q. (BY MR. BOLAND) Dr. Tahir, I want to go back 
17 briefly to a couple issues regarding this slide and 
18 some of your experience. You mentioned before 
t 19 you've testified in rape cases in criminal trials? 
20 A. Yes. 
And you've handled vaginal smear slides from rape I ~ 21 Q. ~ ' 
~ 
victims in your lab? ~ 22 ~-
~ 
~ ~ 
Yes. ~: 23 A. ~ 1'f!: 
24 Q. And can you conclude if you look through one of 
25 those cases that you had handled and saw two sperm 
MIZANIN REPORTING SERVICE, INC. 
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1 Q. Do you know how all these multiple contributors got 
2 there? 
3 A. No idea. 
41 
5 
Q. The same possibilities exist that we mentioned? 
A. Yes. 
6 Q. Handling? 
7 A. Handling. 
8 Q. And in your lab? 
9 A. Yes. 
10 Q. Do you know how many individual person's profiles 
11 are included in the result in A-59-2, the exact 
12 number of people it took to make this mixed stain? 
13 A. No. 
14 Q. Do you know if the person in A-59-2, for example, 
'· 15 
' 
who contributed the 1.2 in the DQ Alpha also 
t
~· 16 contributed the 3 allele in the DQ Alpha? 
"!; 17 
~ 
A. No, I cannot tell you. 
t; 
,• 18 ~.~ 
., 
-~( 
Q. Do you know if any of the DQ Alpha alleles that are 
19 showing up there in that result are connected to any 
20 of the polymarkers that are showing up? Do you know 
21 which ones are connected to which? 
22 A. No. 
23 Q. Can you say that the 4.1 in A-59-2 came from a 
24 particular person? 
25 A. No. 
MIZANIN REPORTING SERVICE, INC. 
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1 Q. Can you say it came from Richard Eberling? 
2, A. No. 
31 Q. 
41 
5/ A. 
61 Q. ) A. 
Is Richard Eberling's DNA in the result A-59-2? Can 
you say his DNA is in there? 
No. 
Can you say his DNA was on that slide? 
No. 
8 Q. Can you say that the 4.1 in the DQ Alpha came from 
9 Richard Eberling and no one else? 
10 A. No. 
11 Q. Is there Richard Eberling's sperm in this sperm 
12 fraction result that you have? 
13 A. No. That's multiple profile. 
14 Q. Is Richard Eberling's sperm in there? 
15 A. No. 
16 MR. GILBERT: It could be, right? 
17 A. When he's asking me these questions, you're asking 
18 identification. 
19 MR. GILBERT: So we make sure about 
~. 20 '.- that. 
' / 21 Q. (BY MR. BOLAND) I'm not asking probability. I'm 
,. 
221 '-
r 
k; 231 
·' r· 
,~ ... l" 
241 A. 1'· 
Q. 251 
saying can you say definitely that Richard 
Eberling's sperm is on this slide? 
I can't tell you the identification of him it's him. 
Is his sperm on this slide? 
MIZANIN REPORTING SERVICE, INC. 
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A. No. 
Q. Can you identify any male who contributed sperm to 
this slide? 
A. No. 
Q. Not Richard Eberling, some other person? 
A. No. 
7 Q. And this entire result you've reported here came 
8 from the two sperm heads that you identified? 
9 A. No. Two sperm heads were seen in the little portion 
10 which I took, but the rest of the sample was in the 
11 tube. That was the presumptive test. 
12 Q. Your assumption is that there's more sperm in that 
13 tube? 
14 A. Yes. Because I can't take all and put it on the 
15 slide. In the tube like that thing is 30 or 40 
16 microliter in the tube. I took half a microliter. 
17 So then I tested the sperm in that. So it's not two 
18 sperms. 
19 Q. You're assuming many more than two sperm? 
20 A. Yes. 
21 Q. You actually only saw two sperm heads? 
22 A. Yes. 
231 
24 
Q. Are there items in these two reports, Tahir Exhibit 
1 and Tahir Exhibit 2, that you tested twice? 
25 A. There may be, yes. 
MIZANIN REPORTING SERVICE, INC. 
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1992 WL 303120, State v, Frye, (Ohio App. 3 Dist. 1992) 
*303120 NOTICE: RULE 2 OF THE OHIO 
SUPREME COURT RULES FOR THE 
REPORTING OF OPINIONS IMPOSES 
RESTRICTIONS AND LIMIT A TIO NS ON THE 
USE OF UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS. 
STATE of Ohio, Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v. 
Jean Marie FRYE, Defendant-Appellant. 
No. 14-92-3. 
Court of Appeals of Ohio, Third District, Union 
County. 
Oct. 21, 1992. 
Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas Court. 
Stuart A. Benis, Columbus, for defendant-appellant. 
R. Larry Schneider, Pros. Atty., Rick Rodger, 
Marysville, for plaintiff-appellee. 
OPINON 
HADLEY, Presiding Judge. 
**1 This is an appeal by Defendant-Appellant, Jean 
Marie Frye, ("Appellant") from the judgment and 
sentencing of the Court of Common Pleas of Union 
County, finding her guilty of complicity to aggravated 
trafficking in violation of R.C. 2923.03 and 
sentencing her to not less than 3 years nor more than 
15 years. 
Union County Sheriff's Department deputy Wertz 
approached Rick Salmons ("Salmons") about making a 
drug purchase from appellant. Salmons agreed as he 
thought it would help reduce his sentence for a 
pending driving under suspension charge. 
Salmons contacted appellant between 10-15 times 
before she agreed to help him purchase cocaine. On 
January 26, 1991, appellant contacted Salmons to 
arrange for the purchase of a quarter ounce of cocaine 
for $450 to be delivered that evening at Salmons' 
residence. Prior to the arrival of appellant and her 
boyfriend, Terry Moore, ("Moore") Deputy Nelson 
placed a microcassette recorder in Salmons' living 
room to record the drug transaction and searched 
Salmons and his residence for any controlled 
substances. No controlled substances were found. 
Deputy Nelson gave Salmons $460 to purchase the 
cocaine. Then Deputy Nelson hid in a closet in 
Salmons' house during the drug transaction. 
Page 1 
On January 27, 1991, at approximately 1: 30 a. m. 
appellant and Moore arrived at Salmons' residence in 
Marysville. During this time, Moore gave Salmons a 
quarter ounce (approximately 7 grams) of cocaine 
with appellant present. Salmons paid Moore $460 for 
the cocaine and appellant gave him $10 change. 
Appellant stated during the transaction that she should 
have not gotten Salmons the "shit" (cocaine) as he did 
not call her anymore. She also stated that from now 
on, he would deal more with Moore than her. 
After appellant and Moore left, Salmons and his 
residence were searched again and the cocaine was 
confiscated by deputy Nelson. 
Moore pied guilty to aggravated trafficking, a fourth 
degree felony, and was awaiting sentencing when he 
testified at appellant's trial. Appellant was charged 
with complicity to aggravated trafficking, a third 
degree felony. As appellant had a prior felony drug 
abuse conviction, the charge of complicity to 
aggravated trafficking was enhanced to a felony in the 
second degree. 
A jury trial was held on December 30th and 31st of 
1991. The jury found appellant guilty of complicity to 
aggravated trafficking. Thereupon, the trial court 
sentenced appellant to not less than 3 years nor more 
than 15 years. Appellant timely appeals from the 
judgment and sentencing and asserts the following six 
assignments of error. 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. I 
The trial court abused its discretion in refusing to 
instruct the jury on the entrapment defense when 
there was sufficient evidence of entrapment, even 
though defendant denied one or more elements of 
the crime. 
Appellant asserts that the trial court should have 
given the jury instruction on the defense of entrapment 
whether or not appellant denied that she aided or 
abetted Moore in the sale of cocaine to Salmons. 
**2 Appellant cites Jacobson v. United States 
(1992), --- U.S.----, --- S.Ct. ----, 118 L.Ed.2d 174, 
in support of her first assignment of error. Jacobson, 
supra, is distinguishable from the case sub Judice. In 
Jacobson, the government not only solicited Jacobson 
for 2 1 /2 years but also induced him to purchase the 
magazines. Herein, Salmons only called appellant 
about the possibility of purchasing cocaine from her. 
There is no testimony that Salmons pressured or 
induced appellant into assisting him in the purchase of 
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cocaine. Appellant then contacted Salmons when she 
and Moore had made arrangements to get the cocaine 
from Moore's supplier in Columbus. 
Appellant also cites State v. Haller (January 24, 
1989), Franklin App. No. 87 AP 143, unreported, in 
support of her assignment of error. However, Haller, 
supra, is distinguishable from the case sub Judice. 
Herein, Salmons did not try to manipulate appellant in 
arranging the drug transaction or in the conversation 
during the drug transaction. 
In State v. Dotson (1987), 35 Ohio App.3d 135, 
139, the court stated that a person is not entrapped 
when police officers merely present the opportunity to 
commit a crime. Under these circumstances, craft 
and pretense may be used. The court further stated 
where there is credible evidence that a defendant has 
the predisposition and criminal design to commit the 
acts and that he was merely provided with an 
opportunity to commit those acts, he has not been 
entrapped. Id. at 139. Herein, appellant was only 
given the opportunity to commit the crime. 
Appellant has the burden of establishing the defense 
of entrapment by a preponderance of the evidence. 
State v. Doran (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 187, 193-194. 
Once the defense of entrapment is established the state 
can rebut the entrapment defense by showing that the 
defendant was merely provided with the opportunity 
to commit the offense and defendant was predisposed 
to commit the crime. State v. Italiano (1985), 18 
Ohio St.3d 38. If the defendant fails to establish that 
he was entrapped, the state is relieved of its burden of 
proving defendant was predisposed to commit the 
crime. State v. Cheraso (1988), 43 Ohio App.3d 221, 
222. In the case sub Judice, appellant on direct 
examination denied any participation in the sale of 
cocaine to Salmons. However, appellant's statements 
in the tape recorded transaction establish that appellant 
was well aware of the drug culture and the 
transaction. 
Herein, appellant has not established by a 
preponderance of the evidence she was entrapped. 
Appellant testified that Salmons called her 10-15 times 
about purchasing cocaine. However, appellant does 
not state that Salmons threatened her or in anyway 
pressured her into selling him cocaine nor does 
appellant contend that she had told Salmons no and to 
quit calling her. In fact, appellant denies any 
participation in the drug transaction. She testified that 
.- she did not know that a drug transaction was to occur 
that evening at Salmons' residence. Appellant 
testified that she went with Moore without any idea 
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that he planned to sell cocaine to Salmons. 
**3 Entrapment occurs when the agents or officers 
of the government originate the idea of a crime and 
then induces another person to commit the crime. 
(Citations omitted) However, one cannot be 
entrapped when she has no knowledge of the crime. 
Appellant cannot argue on one hand that before the 
drug transaction took place, she was totally unaware 
that Moore had planned on selling cocaine to Salmons, 
and also say she was entrapped because Salmons 
called her 10-15 times without showing how she was 
induced by Salmons. 
Whereas appellant did not establish the defense of 
entrapment by a preponderance of the evidence, the 
trial court did not err in refusing to give the jury 
instruction of entrapment and appellant's first 
assignment of error is overruled. 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. II 
The trial court abused it's discretion and violated 
defendant's due process right [sic] in admitting 
selective tape recordings of conversations between 
defendant and a confidential informant when 
portions of the tapes were inaudible, when the tape 
was not presented to defense until shortly before 
trial, when a deputy sheriff with no audio expertise 
altered the audio by dubbing a microcassette into 
[sic] a regular cassette tape on his home stereo 
system to defendant's surprise, when the trial court 
limited inquiry into differences in the audio 
recording in the microcassette and cassette versions, 
when the entire conversation between the 
confidential informant and defendant was not 
recorded and where the parties to the conversation 
had trouble remembering their conversations. 
Appellant's second assignment of error for purposes 
of discussion will be subdivided into four assignments. 
A. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in 
admitting the tape recordings when portions of the 
tape recordings were inaudible and the entire 
conversation between appellant, Moore and Salmons 
was not recorded. 
A tape recording in order to be admissible must be 
authentic, accurate and trustworthy. Admission into 
evidence of tape recordings containing inaudible 
portions is a matter within the sound discretion of the 
trial court. In determining whether or not to admit a 
tape recording, the trial court must decide if the 
unintelligible portions of the tape are so substantial as 
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to render the tape as a whole untrustworthy. State v. 
Gotis (1984), 13 Ohio App.3d 282, 283. See, also 
United States v. Mitchell (1976), 559 F.2d 31, cert. 
denied (1977), 431 U.S. 933; and United States v. 
Slade (1980), 627 F.2d 293. 
The tape was only thirty minutes in length, 
however, appellant and Moore remained at Salmons' 
residence for at least forty minutes. After reviewing 
both the microcassette and the cassette, it is apparent 
that the tapes recorded the entire drug transaction. 
The fact that the trial court permitted the jury to hear 
only the portion of the tape concerning the drug 
transaction and did not admit that portion of the tape 
which contained mere conversation unrelated to the 
drug transaction, was not prejudicial to appellant. 
Therefore, the trial court did not err in admitting the 
tapes into evidence. 
B. The tape was not given to the defense until 
shortly before trial. 
**4 Appellant contends that the state knew of the 
tape recording prior to December 23, 1991, when 
appellant was notified of its existence. Appellant 
received a transcript of the tape on December 24th 
and listened to the tape on the 27th of December. 
Appellant filed a motion in limine regarding the tape 
recording on December 27, 1991. 
In order to find reversible error in admitting the 
tapes, appellant must demonstrate that the trial court 
abused its discretion in admitting the evidence and that 
she was prejudiced as a result of the state's 
noncompliance with discovery. State v. Fricke 
(1984), 13 Ohio App.3d 331, 332. 
Appellant has failed to show that she was prejudiced 
by the state's failure to disclose the tape recording 
prior to the 23rd of December; assuming that the 
state was aware of the existence of the tape recording. 
Appellant did not request a continuance nor was there 
a showing that appellant was ill-prepared at trial. 
Therefore, the admission of the tape recordings was 
not in error. 
C. The original microcassette tape recording was 
altered by the deputy sheriff when he recorded the 
events onto a regular cassette to be played at trial to 
appellant's surprise and the trial court limited inquiry 
into the differences between the tape recordings. 
Appellant contends that the tape was altered when it 
was transferred to a larger cassette. However, 
appellant has failed to show that the content of the 
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tape was altered in any way. After careful review of 
both tape recordings, this court cannot find any 
discrepancies between the two tapes. Appellant upon 
learning that the microcassette had been transferred to 
a larger cassette did not request a continuance or 
request an in camera inspection by the trial court. 
As there were no differences in content between the 
two tapes, the trial court did not err in limiting 
appellant's inquiry into the tapes and admitting the 
tapes into evidence. 
D. The trial court erred in admitting the tapes when 
the parties to the conversation had trouble 
remembering their conversation. 
Appellant contends that some of the statements were 
changed when the tape recording was transcribed. 
However, since the transcript of the tape was not 
allowed into evidence, this issue is not properly before 
this court. 
Next appellant contends that it was difficult to 
conclude who said what in the tape and that the 
witnesses had trouble remembering the conversation 
of that evening independently of the tape. Appellant's 
contention does not preclude the admission of the tape 
but goes only to the weight afforded the tape and the 
credibility of the witnesses. See, State v. Cooper 
(October 2, 1985), Logan App. No. 8-84-31, 
unreported. 
Whereas the trial court did not abuse its discretion 
in admitting the tapes into evidence, appellant's 
second assignment of error is overruled. 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. III 
The trial court erred in entering a finding of guilty 
when the defendant was denied her sixth amendment 
right to competent counsel when her attorney failed 
to file a motion to suppress statements which 
severely affected her defense. 
**S Appellant contends that her appointed counsel, 
prior to her hiring of Mr. Benis, was ineffective as 
she failed to file a motion to suppress her statements 
made to the deputies on May 22, 1991. However, 
appellant has failed to show that her statement to the 
deputies was used at trial. Appellant does not cite 
anywhere in the trial transcript where her statement 
was used to impeach or cross-exam her. Even if her 
statement was used, appellant did not object. As 
appellant's statement was not used in the trial, this 
assignment of error is not properly before this court. 
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See, Paulin v. Midland Mutual Life Ins. Co. (1974), 
37 Ohio St.2d 109. 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. IV 
The trial court abused its discretion in not granting 
relief from appellant's failure to file a pretrial 
motion to suppress statements within 35 days after 
arraignment. 
Appellant now asserts that the trial court erred in 
not allowing her motion to suppress even though it 
was untimely filed. Appellant argues that because she 
hired new counsel on December 5, 1991, the court 
should have granted the motion to suppress filed on 
December 11, 1991, as the hiring of new counsel was 
good cause for waiving the time requirement set forth 
in Crim.R. 12(C). 
Crim.R. 12(C) states that all pretrial motions except 
as provided in Rule 7(E) and Rule 16(F) shall me 
made within 35 days of arraignment or seven days 
before trial, whichever is earlier. (emphasis added). 
The court in the interest of justice may extend the time 
for making pretrial motions. Herein, appellant was 
arraigned on October 16, 1991. The motion to 
suppress was not filed until 55 days after arraignment. 
Therefore, the motion was not made in a timely 
manner. 
Appellant argues that the hiring of new counsel is 
good cause to waive the time requirements in Crim.R. 
12(C). However, appellant has not shown that the 
state used her statement at trial or how she was 
prejudiced, if the statement was used. Appellant's 
attorney does not specifically point out where her 
statement was used at trial. Nor was appellant's 
statement marked as an exhibit or admitted into 
evidence. A bare assertion by appellant is not 
sufficient to show that the trial court abused its 
discretion in overruling her motion to suppress as 
untimely. Therefore, appellant's fourth assignment of 
error is overruled. 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. V 
The trial court abused its discretion and usurped 
the function of the jury as a factfinder [sic] in ruling 
that defendant could not mention the chain of 
custody of the cocaine in her closing argument, and 
in taking the factual issue of whether the cocaine 
admitted as evidence at the trial was the same 
substance that was allegedly sold by the defendant 
away from the jury. 
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Appellant asserts that the trial court's statement to 
the jury that the issue of chain of custody of the 
cocaine was not a determination for the jury, thereby 
not allowing appellant to comment on whether the 
cocaine produced at trial was the same substance as 
that sold to Salmons. 
**6 A strict chain of custody is not required before 
physical evidence will be admitted into trial. State v. 
Wilkins (1980), 64 Ohio St.2d 382. The state needs 
only to establish that it is reasonably certain that 
substitution, alteration or tampering did not occur. 
Furthermore, any breaks in the chain of custody goes 
to the weight afforded to the evidence not to its 
admissibility. State v. Blevins ( 1987), 36 Ohio 
App.3d 147, 150. See, also, State v. Nichols 
(December 11, 1991), Allen App. No. 3-90-35, 
unreported; Srate v. Watson (August 27, 1990), 
Logan App. No. 8-89-6, unreported. 
The state established the chain of custody of the 
cocaine through the testimony of Deputy Nelson and 
the BCI chemist, Gregory Kiddon. Appellant 
objected to the admission of the cocaine on the basis 
of chain of custody. As the chain of custody was 
reasonably established, the trial court properly 
overruled appellant's objection. 
Appellant's attorney during closing argument began 
to comment on the chain of custody. The state 
objected and the trial court sustained the objection. 
Thereafter the trial court instructed the jury: 
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, the question and 
issue of chain of custody is not one for you to make 
a determination on here today, and not part of your 
function as fact finders in this case. 
As the issue of chain of custody goes to the weight 
afforded the evidence not its admissibility, the trial 
court erred in instructing the jury that this was not an 
issue before them. However, in view of the trial 
court's instruction to the jury (you are the sole judges 
of the facts, the credibility of the witnesses and the 
weight of the evidence) and the fact that appellant did 
not show that the chain of custody was broken or that 
the cocaine introduced at trial had been tampered, 
altered or substituted, the error was harmless. 
Therefore, appellant's fifth assignment of error is 
overruled. 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. VI 
The trial court violated defendant's rights to 
confront witnesses and deprived defendant of a fair 
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trial when it abused its discretion by limiting legally 
admissible evidence bearing directly on credibility 
of adverse witnesses, by allowing the prosecutor to 
read a transcript that was previously excluded as 
inaccurate of the alleged sale to the jury in closing 
argument but in refusing to allow defendant to use 
the same transcript as an aid to cross examine [sic] 
witnesses during the trial. 
As appellant's sixth assignment of error addresses 
two separate and distinct issues, they will be discussed 
separately. 
A. The trial court erred in allowing Moore to claim 
the privilege against self-incrimination when 
questioned about other drug transactions on cross-
examination by appellant and limited appellant's 
questioning of other witnesses. 
Appellant's attorney states in his brief that the trial 
court allowed Moore to plead the fifth amendment 
during cross-examination about "specific, legitimate 
details about the transaction (in question) on cross 
examination [sic]." 
**7 Upon review of appellant's attorney cross-
examination of Moore, he asked 230 questions of 
Moore. Out of the 230 questions, Moore only 
claimed the privilege of self-incrimination once. The 
question by appellant's attorney in which Moore 
claimed the privilege of self-incrimination was not 
related to the transaction in question, but to uncharged 
misconduct of the witness. Appellant's attorney 
questioned Moore as to his bias, memory and his 
credibility. The one question that Moore refused to 
answer, did not deprive appellant of her right to 
confront this witness or deprive her of a fair trial. 
See, State v. Williams (1981), 1 Ohio App.3d 156. 
Therefore, the trial court did not err in allowing 
Moore to plead the fifth amendment on that one 
question. 
Next appellant's attorney in his brief argues that the 
trial court abused its discretion by limiting the cross-
examination of Deputy Nelson about the differences in 
the tapes. As this court stated in assignment of error 
number 2(C), the tapes did not contain any 
discrepancies, therefore, the trial court did not err in 
not allowing appellant's attorney to cross-examine 
deputy Nelson on this issue. 
Appellant's attorney in his brief then asserts that the 
trial court limited the cross-examination of Salmons 
regarding the charge for which he was jailed. 
Appellant's attorney did cross-examine Salmons as to 
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any reduction he received for his driving during 
suspension charge by becoming an informant. The 
trial court ruled that appellant's attorney could not ask 
Salmons if he was in jail but could ask him if he was 
under sentence. Again appellant's attorney is 
implying that one question propounded to a witness 
constitutes a denial of appellant's right to confront 
witnesses. This one question does not amount to a 
violation of appellant's sixth amendment rights. 
Appellant's attorney in his brief also asserts that the 
trial court erred when it prevented appellant from 
testifying why she was afraid of Moore and why he 
would lie against her. The trial court did not deny 
appellant's attorney from eliciting testimony from 
appellant regarding why she was afraid of Moore. 
The trial court allowed appellant to testify that Moore 
tried to kill her, their relationship was violent, that she 
was afraid of Moore, and that Moore was testifying 
against her because she had him arrested for domestic 
violence on two occasions, the last one being after the 
sale of cocaine to Salmons. Therefore, there was no 
error committed by the trial court. 
Next appellant's attorney argues that these incidents 
taken as a whole amount to a denial of appellant's 
sixth amendment right and a denial of a fair trial. 
These four incidents taken separately or as a whole, 
do not amount to a denial of appellant's right to 
confront witnesses or amount to a denial of a right to 
a fair trial. Therefore, the trial court did not deny 
appellant of her sixth amendment right to confront 
witnesses. 
B. The trial court erred in allowing the prosecutor 
to read from the transcript of the tape in closing 
argument but did not allow appellant's attorney to use 
the transcript during cross-examination of the state's 
witnesses. 
**8. Appellant's attorney filed a motion in limine 
regarding the admissibility of the tapes and the 
transcript of the tape. The trial court ruled that the 
transcript would not be allowed into evidence, but the 
parties could use the transcript to follow along with 
the tape during the trial court's hearing on appellant's 
motion in limine. 
Appellant's attorney now argues that the prosecutor 
read from the transcript of the tape to the jury in his 
closing argument. However, appellant's attorney does 
not specifically point out where the prosecutor read 
from the transcript during his closing argument. 
Since the transcript of the tape, of which appellant's 
attorney received a copy, was not admitted or attached 
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to appellant's brief, this issue is not properly before 
this court. 
Appellant's attorney next argues that the trial court 
erred by not allowing him to use the transcript for 
purposes of cross-examination. However, appellant's 
attorney is the one who objected to the use of the 
transcript and the trial court agreed. Appellant's 
attorney did not want the transcript put into evidence, 
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therefore, he cannot complain when the trial court did 
not allow him to use the transcript on cross-
examination. Therefore, appellant's sixth assignment 
of error is overruled and the judgment and sentencing 
of the trial court is affirmed. 
Judgment affirmed. 
EV ANS and SHAW, JJ., concur. 
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